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Devolved government in London – focusing on the executive Mayor and Greater London Assembly – started as a
radical innovation in 2000. Its generally successful development has sparked a slow, ‘organic’ spread of executive
Mayors to other English cities and conurbations.  As part of the 2017 Audit of UK Democracy , Andrew Blick
and Patrick Dunleavy explore how democratically and effectively the two London institutions have performed.
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What does democracy require of London’s devolved government?
 
Elected politicians should normally maintain full public control of devolved government and
public services. In the London system this means there should be accountable and
transparent government exercised by the Mayor. The Assembly should ensure close scrutiny
of the executive, and allow other parties to articulate reasoned opposition via its proceedings.
 
TheGreater London Authority (GLA, comprised of the Mayor and Assembly acting together)
should be a critically important focus of London-wide political debate, particularly (but not
limited to) issues of devolved competence, articulating ‘public opinion’ in ways that provide
useful guidance to decision-makers in making complex policy choices.
 
Individually and collectively Assembly members should seek to uncover and publicise issues of
1/8
public concern and citizens’ grievances, giving effective representation both to majority and
minority views, and showing a consensus regard for the public interest.
 
The London Mayor as executive should govern responsively, prioritising the public interest and
reflecting public opinion in the capital.
 
The GLA administration should be realistically and reliably funded, with resources so scaled
that it could carry out its functions well, so long as it is efficiently and effectively run.
 
The GLA should be a stable part of the UK’s constitutional set-up, with considerable protection
against ill-considered or partisan interventions in how it works originating from central
government or Parliament.
The Greater London Authority (GLA) was established after a 1998 referendum, which saw Londoners endorse – by
72 per cent on a 34 per cent turnout – a new strategic government for the capital proposed by the Blair government.
It consists primarily of a Mayor and Assembly, each elected by voters across London every four years. The mayor
controls the GLA’s executive powers, which cover strategic and London-wide functions – especially public transport
and roads, policing via the Metropolitan Police, fire services, and strategic planning and economic development.
The small (25 member) Assembly is elected using a form of proportional representation. It scrutinises the mayor’s
policies, budgets and conduct in office, and allows different parties to develop and advocate for varying policy
agendas. All other local government services are run by 32 London boroughs, with which the GLA must co-operate
to achieve many goals (see below).
 The GLA was deliberately set up by Tony Blair to be a slim top-tier body, with a strong mayor and a weak Assembly,
whose members would be forced to focus on London-wide issues, and not local ones. The Assembly’s only clear
powers are that it can reject or amend the strategies or the budget that the mayor proposes. However, in both cases,
a two-thirds majority in the Assembly is required to replace the original proposal, which is very difficult to achieve. So
in practical terms the Assembly can only scrutinise the activities of the Mayor through a range of committees. It can
also hold public hearings with the key post holders appointed by the Mayor, but lacks the power to block their
appointment.
Recent developments
In the fourth round of the mayoral elections in 2016, using the Supplementary Vote election system which requires
candidates to gain a majority of eligible votes, Labour’s Sadiq Khan won 58% support in the run-off stage to
convincingly beat the Tory candidate, Zac Goldsmith. He succeeded Boris Johnson, who had served eight years as
London mayor. Khan’s manifesto priorities were to build more homes (of which half would have to be ‘genuinely
affordable’), freeze transport costs and tackle gangs and knife crime. In an effort to reduce air pollution, the mayor
also announced a ‘T-charge’ (a levy on more polluting vehicles) to apply within London’s congestion charging zone
from late 2017.
The Assembly election uses a form of Additional Member System (AMS), with 14 local constituency seats (spanning
two or three London boroughs) with winners elected by ‘first past the post’ (or plurality rule) voting. However, voters
then have a second vote for 11 London-wide seats, which are distributed to parties so as to make their total seats
shares align with their vote shares. In 2016 Labour and the Conservatives won all the local seats between them, and
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gained top-up seats as well – ending up with 12 and 8 total seats respectively. This continued a pattern that
stretches back over many elections for the top two parties to dominate the capital’s politics. The Greens (2 seats),
Liberal Democrats (1 seat) and UKIP (2 seats) had more limited success at the top-up seat stage.
Turnout in 2016 rose to 45 per cent, matching the 2008 peak when Boris Johnson was first elected.
Chart 1: The percentage turnout in the five London mayoral and Assembly elections since 2000
In the June 2016 Brexit referendum just under 60 per cent of Londoners voted to remain in the EU, reflecting the
city’s more youthful population, and perhaps factors such as the importance of EU workers for many key industries
and services, and the capital’s stronger dependence on Europe for trade and markets.  Efforts by Sadiq Kahn to
influence UK policy towards a ‘softer’ Brexit (backed by the vast majority of bigger London businesses) have so far
been decisively rejected by Whitehall.
Finally, the GLA’s policy roles and competencies sprang into far greater prominence in the spring and summer of
2017 following three terrorist attacks in central London (two on iconic bridges), plus the catastrophic fire in the
municipal Grenfell Tower block. For homeland security it became clear that protecting citizens from vehicular
assaults would require a far-reaching re-assessment of roadside barriers (belatedly introduced on London bridges)
and other ‘passive’ measures. This will require much greater liaison between the Metropolitan Police and GLA and
borough highway authorities. The fire tragedy also attracted criticism for the initial response by the small Kensington
and Chelsea borough and by Whitehall departments; the possible under-funding and under-management of public
housing that had gone before; and issues about the adequacy of fire regulations policed by the GLA-controlled fire
service. There are implications here for the two-tier local governance of London, with the mayor and GLA likely to
emerge with stronger abilities to guide how boroughs carry out some functions.
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
3/8
Current strengths Current weaknesses
Mayoral elections have proved genuinely
competitive, with the winners being an independent
candidate (Ken Livingstone in 2000), Labour
candidates (Livingstone in 2004 and Sadiq Khan in
2016) and a Conservative candidate (Boris
Johnson in 2008 and 2012). In each round the top
two candidates have been very easily identified by
voters. Turnout has been substantial for new
bodies, recently established, and has risen overall.
Theoretically any mayor whose party holds 9 or more votes
in the 25 member Assembly can never be defeated, and so
need take no notice of its views. In practice, mayors have
wanted to be seen as performing well in scrutiny meetings
and as acting with majority support in the Assembly. But
these more subtle means of Assembly influence are not
widely known, and its role is not seen as very important by
most London citizens. By contrast, the mayor is seen as
very powerful.
The intense interest generated
by these contests, and the strong legitimacy
produced by winning clear majorities under the SV
voting system, have made the London Mayor a key
politician not just in London, but across the UK and
internationally. Each of the Mayors has been able to
represent London internally and externally, wielding
both hard power (via extensive policy reach) and
soft power (via media prominence and a clear
mandate).
In the mayoral election, voters have first and second
preference choices. If no one wins over 50% support on first
preferences, then the top two candidates stay in the race
and all others are eliminated. The second preferences
ballots cast by voters supporting for eliminated candidates
are examined, and any 2nd votes for the candidates still in
the race are added to their piles. However, if voters cast
both preferences for eliminated candidates, these are not
‘eligible’ and do not influence the result.
Since it was established, the GLA has become a
firmly established fixture of UK governance and its
powers have expanded over time. For the
foreseeable future, it is difficult to imagine any UK
government seeking to abolish it, as Margaret
Thatcher did with its predecessor (the Greater
London Council) in 1986.
Despite the high level of public attention around mayoral
elections, turnout in elections has fluctuated between the
low 30s and mid 40s (see Chart 1 above) – levels found in
other local elections, and well below those in the devolved
countries.
Mayors have made creative use of the powers they
possess, especially in the field of transport. The
congestion charge (introduced by Ken Livingstone)
is a good example of innovation in this area. Their
‘soft power’ advocacy has also been influential, for
instance in encouraging take up of the London
Living Wage.
Smaller parties, those which win less than 5% of the
London-wide votes for the Assembly, are debarred from
winning any seats through a rule inserted to discourage
undue party fragmentation under PR. The larger parties
gain from this.
The AMS election system for the Assembly has led
to a greater diversity of parties being represented
there, reflecting to a good extent the diversity of
views within the huge London electorate.
When parties win top-up Assembly seats, the successful
candidates are chosen in order from a ‘closed’ party list,
which voters cannot influence.
The supplementary vote system used for the
mayoral elections creates the opportunity for a
larger proportion of voters both to choose their
favoured candidates and have more influence on
the outcome than they would do under a simple
plurality voting system.
Theoretically, in a very tight race, the SV system used for
the Mayoral election could lead to a candidate who came
second on first preferences winning at the second round. So
far in practice the contest has in fact always been won by
the leading candidate in first preferences.
The Assembly has 20% ethnic minority members
and a generally better gender balance (with women
forming 40% of members) than most UK political
institutions. However, black and Asian minority
ethnic people now form 40% of London’s
population, so that much remains to be achieved.
Ten of the 14 Assembly local constituency seats have never
changed party control, which may lead to complacency and
inertia.
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Mayors must negotiate many of the policies with Whitehall,
or with quasi-government agencies running functions like
airports or national railways, or the 32 London boroughs
running local services. Success here involves ‘soft’ rather
than ‘hard’ power. The seven strategic plans that the Mayor
is required to produce rely a lot on others for their
implementation - eg, despite strenuous efforts, mayors have
made little discernible impact on decisions about London
airport capacity.
Current strengths Current weaknesses
Opportunities Threats
The Brexit process has seemingly
strengthened Londoners’ sense of the capital
as having distinct economic interests. Although
exiting the EU may overall harm London’s
economy (see threats), the transferring back of
powers from Brussels may create new
opportunities for repatriated functions to
expand the scope and coherence of GLA
policy roles. Whitehall ‘overload’ post-Brexit
may also increase favourable shifts of
responsibilities.
The Brexit process promises to be turbulent and may adversely
affect financial services, a key part of London’s economy and tax
base. The 2017 Tory manifesto also indicated the government
would move large numbers of civil service jobs and some cultural
institutions out of London.
The mayor may also be able to sustain the
domestic momentum it had previously
generated towards the extension of GLA’s
powers. This push could also capitalise on the
wider trend towards greater devolution in the
UK.
If tensions between the GLA and the London Boroughs grow,
plans to build affordable housing may be hampered.
Brexit could be used to justify the argument
that London should have independent capacity
to respond flexibly to the challenges leaving
the EU creates.
The 2017 Conservative election manifesto suddenly proposed to
scrap the SV system used for electing the executive mayors in
London and other UK cities, replacing it with first past the post.
This would tend to wreck the mayor’s legitimacy and in multi-
party politics could lead to winners with far less than majority
support. Since the voting system was part of a package
approved by a London referendum in 1998, it is unclear that
Westminster can make such a change without another
referendum. The Tories lost the election, with the manifesto
being rated disastrous, so that no action may follow.
A Conservative government could be reluctant to transfer
significant new powers to or otherwise cooperate with the now
Labour-dominated GLA.
Further devolution to England may be concentrated on cities or
regions that did not previously have it, so that London might lose
out.
The Assembly’s limited role may become harder to justify in
future, given its relative insignificance in constitutional and
governmental processes.
How the Authority works
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The Greater London Authority was established under the Greater London Authority Act 1999 , with the inaugural
elections to the Greater London Assembly and for the office of Mayor held in May 2000. The introduction of the
Authority followed a period, since 1986 and the abolition of the Greater London Council, in which there had been no
directly elected tier of governance for London. The Authority is often regarded as being devolved rather than local-
level government, though it does not possess powers as extensive as those attached to the devolved institutions in
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland that were also established at around the same time. In particular, the Authority
does not have the full primary law-making powers that are attached to those devolved institutions.
Other areas in which the mayor has the power to operate are policing, economic development, housing and
regeneration. These powers are exercised via four functional bodies: Transport for London; GLA Land and Property;
the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority; and the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime. The Mayor is
also required to produce strategies for transport, housing, culture, economic development, health inequalities and
spatial development.  The Mayor is also able to intervene in some local authority planning decisions. The Authority
raises money from council tax precepts; business rates; transport charges; and an infrastructure levy.
Successive Acts of Parliament have expanded the powers of the Authority: the Greater London Authority Act 2007
granted new roles in skills and employment, and housing. The Localism Act 2011 gave the Mayor more land and
housing powers; and allowed the Mayor to form Mayoral Development Corporations. The Police Reform and Social
Responsibility Act 2011 made the Mayor the Police and Crime Commissioner for London; and the Public Bodies Act
2011 gave the Authority some development powers.
Financial dependency and budgets
Like all local authorities in the UK, the Greater London Authority must legally submit a balanced budget, where its
current spending and revenues are equal. As Table 1 shows the scale of GLA operations is vast, with current
spending of £11.8 billion. Because of transport receipts the Authority actually generates over 70 per cent of its own
resources, but depends on Whitehall for grants of over a fifth of its income, and also has local business rates
redistributed away by Whitehall to other poorer authorities. It collects a share of business rates and levies a council
tax precept that is collected by the boroughs on its behalf.





Whitehall grants 2.610 22
General income 1.405 12
Business rates (GLA retains) 1.307 11
Council tax .805 7
Paid to Whitehall from business rates .754 6
Total revenue 11.758 100
Note: Fares, general income, GLA-retained business rates and council tax are locally generated revenues.
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This situation may look quite favourable, but Whitehall grants were severely cutback in the austerity period (2010-
17), with drastic consequences for London police and fire services where personnel numbers had to be greatly
reduced. Central departments also control much of the GLA’s vital capital budgets, which are very large because of
major transport projects.
The London Finance Commission, first formed by the Mayor in 2012, recommended that the GLA should take on
complete responsibility for a wide range of taxes such as council tax, stamp duty, business rates and capital gains
tax. This change would be accompanied by a reduction in central funding for the Authority, thereby increasing its
autonomy and responsibility. The Commission has also supported the idea of new taxes, such as a levy on tourism.
A 2017 report lays out the scope for further functions to be devolved to the capital, building on the momentum for
more powers to be devolved to cities or city regions within England.
Two tier government
One reason why the GLA’s predecessor London-wide body was abolished by the Thatcher government in the mid
1980s was conflict between the Labour GLC and many of the 32 London boroughs under Conservative control,
produced by an overlap of functions. So the design of the GLA was designed to keep the mayor (and especially the
constituency Assembly members) from interfering in purely local issues. This design aim has generally been
achieved, but there are inevitably some tensions between the more dynamic GLA and the small and slower-moving
London Boroughs – e.g. over plans to build more affordable housing to combat the capital’s crisis of housing costs
that are well above ordinary Londoners’ ability to pay.
Conclusions
London’s strategic government has succeeded far better than its creators could have envisaged. The London mayor
is an internationally known representative of the capital, and all five mayoral terms have created strong electoral
legitimacy for the office-holders. By contrast the Assembly has been inhibited by its lack of powers from playing a
major role or establishing a strong public profile.
London-wide issues have been successfully addressed by the GLA, especially on transport improvements and road
charging. But policing, homeland security, responding to Brexit and other areas have been hampered by continued
Whitehall interference. The current system may seem ‘entrenched’, but rash proposals to wreck the mayoral voting
system in the Tory 2017 manifesto show that some in Westminster still refuse to recognise the reality that devolved
powers are devolved.
This post does not represent the views of the LSE.
Andrew Blick is Lecturer in Politics and Contemporary History at King’s College London.
Patrick Dunleavy is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the LSE.
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